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Abstract— We consider the General Gaussian Multiple Access
Wire-Tap Channel (GGMAC-WT). In this scenario, multiple
users communicate with an intended receiver in the presence of
an intelligent and informed eavesdropper. We define two suitable
secrecy measures, termed individual and collective, to reflect
the confidence in the system for this multi-access environment.
We determine achievable rates such that secrecy to some pre-
determined degree can be maintained, using Gaussian codebooks.
We also find outer bounds for the case when the eavesdropper
receives a degraded version of the intended receiver’s signal. In
the degraded case, Gaussian codewords are shown to achieve
the sum capacity for collective constraints. In addition, a TDMA
scheme is shown to also achieve sum capacity for both sets of
constraints. Numerical results showing the new rate region are
presented and compared with the capacity region of the Gaussian
Multiple-Access Channel (GMAC) with no secrecy constraints.
We then find the secrecy sum-rate maximizing power allocations
for the transmitters, and show that a cooperative jamming scheme
can be used to increase achievable rates in this scenario.
I. INTRODUCTION
Shannon, in [1], analyzed secrecy systems in communi-
cations and showed that to achieve perfect secrecy of com-
munications, the conditional probability of the cryptogram
given a message must be independent of the actual transmitted
message. In [2], Wyner applied this concept to the discrete
memoryless channel, with a wire-tapper who has access to a
degraded version of the intended receiver’s signal. He mea-
sured the amount of “secrecy” using the conditional entropy
∆, the conditional entropy of the transmitted message given
the received signal at the wire-tapper. In [2], the region of all
possible (R,∆) pairs was determined, and the existence of
a secrecy capacity, Cs, for communication below which it is
possible to transmit zero information to the wire-tapper was
shown.
Carleial and Hellman, in [3], showed that it is possible
to send several low-rate messages, each completely protected
from the wire-tapper individually, and use the channel at close
to capacity. However, if any of the messages are available to
the wire-tapper, the secrecy of the rest may also be compro-
mised. In [4], the authors extended Wyner’s results in [2] and
Carleial and Hellman’s results in [3] to Gaussian channels.
Csisza´r and Ko¨rner, in [5], showed that Wyner’s results can
be extended to weaker, so called “less noisy” and “more ca-
pable” channels. Furthermore, they analyzed the more general
case of sending common information to both the receiver and
the wire-tapper, and private information to the receiver only.
It was argued in [6], that the secrecy constraint developed
by Wyner and later utilized by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner was “weak”
since it only constrained the rate of information leaked to the
wire-tapper, rather than the total information. It was shown that
Wyner’s scenario could be extended to “strong” secrecy using
extractor functions with no loss in achievable rates, where the
secrecy constraint is placed on the total information obtained
by the wire-tapper, as the information of interest might be in
the small amount leaked.
Maurer, [7], and Bennett et. al., [8], later focused on the
process of “distilling” a secret key between two parties in
the presence of a wire-tapper utilizing a source of common
randomness. In this scenario, the wire-tapper has partial infor-
mation about a common random variable shared by the two
parties, and the parties use their knowledge of the wire-tapper’s
limitations to distill a secret key. Reference [7] showed that for
the case when the wire-tap channel capacity is zero between
two users, the existence of a “public” feedback channel that
the wire-tapper can also observe, enables the two parties to be
able to generate a secret key with perfect secrecy.
In [9] and [10], the secrecy key capacities and common ran-
domness capacities, the maximum rates of common random-
ness that can be generated by two terminals, were developed
for several models. Csisza´r and Narayan extended Ahslwede
and Csisza´r’s previous work to multiple-terminals by looking
at what a helper terminal can contribute in [11], and the case of
multiple terminals where an arbitrary number of terminals are
trying to distill a secret key and a subset of these terminals
can act as helper terminals to the rest in [12]. Venkatesan
and Anantharam examined the cases where the two terminals
generating common randomness were connected via discrete
memoryless channels (DMC’s) in [13], and later generalized
this to a network of DMC’s connecting any finite number of
terminals in [14].
More recently, the notion of the wire-tap channel has been
extended to parallel channels, [15], [16], relay channels, [17],
and fading channels, [18]. Fading and parallel channels were
examined together in [19], [20]. Broadcast and interference
channels with confidential messages were considered in [21].
References [22], [23] examined the multiple access channel
with confidential messages, where two transmitters try to keep
their messages secret from each other while communicating
with a common receiver. In [22], an achievable region is found
in general, and the capacity region is found for some special
cases.
In this paper, we consider the General Gaussian Multiple
Access Wire-Tap Channel (GGMAC-WT), and present our re-
sults to date under the fairly general model of a wireless chan-
nel through which each user transmits open and confidential
messages. We consider two separate secrecy constraints, which
we call the individual and collective secrecy constraints, to
reflect the differing amounts of confidence that users can place
on the network, as defined in [24]. These two different sets
of security constraints are (i) the normalized entropy of any
set of messages conditioned on the transmitted codewords of
the other users and the received signal at the wire-tapper, and
(ii) the normalized entropy of any set of messages conditioned
on the wire-tapper’s received signal. Individual constraints are
more conservative to ensure secrecy of any group of users
even when the remaining users are compromised. Collective
constraints, on the other hand, rely on the secrecy of all users,
and as such enable an increase in the achievable secrecy rates.
In [24], we considered perfect secrecy for both constraints for
the degraded wire-tapper case. In [25], [26], we examined the
achievable rates when we relaxed our secrecy constraints so
that a certain amount 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 of the total information
was to be kept secret for the degraded case. We also found
outer bounds for the secrecy rates, and showed using collective
secrecy constraints, the Gaussian codebooks achieve sum
capacity. In addition TDMA was shown to be optimal for both
constraints and achieve sum-capacity. In [27], we considered
the General (non-degraded) GMAC and found an achievable
secrecy/rate region. In this case, we were also presented with
a sum-rate maximization problem, as the maximum achievable
rate depends on the transmit powers. We noted that users may
trade secrecy rates such that even “bad” users may achieve
positive secret rates at the behalf of the “good” users. In
addition, we found the sum-rate maximizing power allocations.
We also introduced the notion of a subset of users jamming
the eavesdropper to help increase the secrecy sum-rate. This
notion, which we term cooperative jamming, is considered in
detail in this paper.
II. MAIN RESULTS
Our main contributions in this area are listed below,
1) We define two sets of information theoretic secrecy
measures for a multiple-access channel:
• Individual: Secrecy is maintained for any user even
if the remaining users are compromised.
• Collective: Secrecy is achieved with the assumption
that all users are secure.
2) Using Gaussian codebooks, we find achievable regions
for both sets of constraints. These rates may be strength-
ened as in [6] to get strong secret key rates.
3) For the degraded case, we find outer bounds for both sets
of constraints and show that the sum capacity bound is
the same for both sets of constraints.
• For individual constraints, the achievable region is
a subset of the outer bounds, but using TDMA it is
possible to achieve the sum capacity.
• For collective constraints, it is shown that Gaussian
codebooks achieve the sum capacity.
These outer bounds are “strong” in the sense of [6],
and hence we determine the strong secrecy key sum-
capacities when the eavesdropper is degraded.
4) When the transmitters only have secret messages to
send, we determine the power allocations that maximize
the secrecy sum-rate.
5) We show that a scheme where users cooperate, with
“bad” users helping “better” users by jamming the
eavesdropper, may achieve higher secrecy rates or allow
the “better” user to achieve a positive secrecy capacity.
We term this scheme cooperative jamming.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
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Fig. 1. The standardized GMAC-WT system model
We consider K users communicating with an intended
receiver in the presence of an intelligent and informed eaves-
dropper. Each transmitter k ∈ K , {1, 2, . . . ,K} chooses
a secret message W sk from a set of equally likely messages
Wsk = {1, . . . ,M sk}, and an open message W ok from a set
of equally likely messages Wok = {1, . . . ,Mok}. Let Mk ,
M skM
o
k , Wk , (W
s
k ,W
o
k ), and Wk , Wsk × Wok . The
messages are encoded into n-length codes {X˜nk (Wk)}. The
encoded messages {X˜k} = {X˜nk } are then transmitted, and
the intended receiver and the wire-tapper each get a copyY =
Y n and Z = Zn. The receiver decodesY to get an estimate of
the transmitted messages, Wˆ. We would like to communicate
with the receiver with arbitrarily low probability of error, while
maintaining perfect secrecy for the secret messages given a set
of secrecy constraints to be defined shortly. By intelligent and
informed eavesdropper, we mean that the channel parameters
are universally known, including at the eavesdropper, and that
the eavesdropper also has knowledge of the codebooks and
coding scheme known. The signals at the intended receiver
and the wiretapper are given by
Y =
∑K
k=1
√
hMkX˜k + N˜M (1)
Z =
∑K
k=1
√
hWkX˜k + N˜W (2)
where N˜M, N˜W are the AWGN. Each component of N˜M ∼
N (0, σ2M) and N˜W ∼ N (0, σ2W). We also assume the following
transmit power constraints:
1
n
n∑
i=1
X˜2ki ≤ ˜¯Pk, k = 1, . . . ,K (3)
We examine the GGMAC-WT by an equivalent standard
form, as in [26]:
Y =
∑K
k=1Xk +NM (4)
Z =
∑K
k=1
√
hkXk +NW (5)
where
• the original codewords are scaled to get Xk =
√
hM
k
σ2M
X˜k.
• The wiretapper’s new channel gains are hk = h
W
kσ
2
M
hM
k
σ2W
.
• The noises are normalized by NM = N˜Mσ2M and NW =
N˜W
σ2W
.
• The new maximum power constraints are P¯k = h
M
k
σ2M
˜¯Pk .
We can show that the eavesdropper gets a stochastically
degraded version of the receiver’s signal if h1 = . . . =
hK ≡ h < 1. Since the receivers do not cooperate, the
capacity region depends only on the conditional marginals,
and is equivalent to that of a physically degraded channel,
which in turn is equivalent to Z being a noisier version of Y:
Z =
√
hY +NMW (6)
where NMW ∼ N (0, (1− h)I). In practical situations, we can
think of this as the eavesdropper being able to wire-tap the
receiver rather than receive the signals itself.
A. Secrecy Measures
We aim to provide each group of users with a pre-
determined amount of secrecy. Letting ∆S be our secrecy
constraint for any subset S of users, we require that ∆S ≥ 1
for all sets S ⊆ K. To that end, in [24], we used an approach
similar to [2], [4], and defined two sets of secrecy constraints
using the normalized equivocations. These are:
1) Individual Constraints: Define
∆Ik ,
H(W sk |Xkc ,Z)
H(W sk )
∀k = 1, ...,K (7)
where kc is the set of all users except user k. If H(W sk ) = 0,
we define ∆Ik = 1. ∆Ik denotes the normalized entropy of a
user’s message given the received signal at the wire-tapper as
well as all other users’ transmitted symbols. This constraint
guarantees that information obtained at the wire-tapper about
the user k’s signal is limited even if all other users are
compromised. Let WsS , {W sk}k∈S for any set S ⊆ K of
users. Define
∆IS ,
H(WsS |XSc ,Z)
H(WsS)
∀S ⊆ K = {1, . . . ,K} (8)
Assume ∆Ik ≥ δ for all users in a set S = {1, . . . , S}. Then,
we can show that
H(WsS |XSc ,Z) =
∑S
k=1H(W
s
k |Ws1,...,k−1,XSc ,Z) (9)
≥∑Sk=1H(W sk |Ws1,...,k−1,Xkc ,Z) (10)
=
∑S
k=1H(W
s
k |Xkc ,Z) (11)
≥∑Sk=1δH(W sk ) (12)
= δH(WsS) (13)
where Ws1,...,k−1 , {W s1 , . . . ,W sk−1}, and we used W sk →
Xk → Z. Hence, individual constraints on each user guarantee
that the constraint is satisfied for all groups of users.
2) Collective Constraints: The individual constraints (7)
are a conservative measure as they reflect the case where users
do not trust the secrecy of other users. We next define a revised
secrecy measure to take into account the multi-access nature
of the channel, where there is more trust in the system, and
users can count on this to achieve higher secrecy rates:
∆CK ,
H(WsK|Z)
H(WsK)
(14)
which is the normalized equivocation of all the secret messages
in the system. Similar to the individual constraints case,
consider this measure for an arbitrary subset S of users:
∆CS ,
H(WsS |Z)
H(WsS)
(15)
Assume ∆CK ≥ 1− ǫ for some arbitrarily small ǫ. Then,
H(WsK|Z) ≥ H(WsK)− ǫH(WsK) (16)
H(WsS |Z) ≥ H(WsS) +H(WsSc |WsS)− ǫH(WsK)
−H(WsSc |WsS ,Z) (17)
≥ H(WsS)− ǫH(WsK) (18)
∆CS ≥ 1− ǫ′ (19)
where ǫ′ , H(W
s
K
)
H(Ws
S
) ǫ → 0 as ǫ → 0. If H(WsS) = 0, then
we define ∆S = 1. Thus, the perfect secrecy of the system
implies the perfect secrecy of any group of users. Hence, we
only impose the system secrecy constraint in (14). Note that
in the previous section, we showed that if ∆Ik ≥ 1 − ǫ for
all k, then ∆IK ≡ ∆CK ≥ 1 − ǫ, which is why the collective
constraint is strictly weaker than the individual constraint.
B. Preliminary Definitions
Definition 1 (Achievable rates). Let Rk = (Rsk, Rok). The
rate vector R = (R1, . . . ,RK) is said to be achievable if
for any given ǫ > 0 there exists a code of sufficient length n
such that
1
n
log2M
s
k ≥ Rsk − ǫ k = 1, . . . ,K (20)
1
n
log2M
o
k ≥ Rok − ǫ k = 1, . . . ,K (21)
and
Pe =
1∏K
k=1Mk
∑
W∈×Kk=1Wk
Pr{Wˆ 6=W|W sent} ≤ ǫ (22)
is the average probability of error. In addition,
∆Ik ≥ 1− ǫ, ∀k ∈ K, if using individual constraints (23)
∆CK ≥ 1− ǫ, if using collective constraints (24)
We will call the set of all achievable rates C I for individual
constraints, and CC for collective constraints.
Definition 2 (Achievable rates with δ-secrecy). We say
that Rδ = (Rδ1, . . . , RδK) is δ-achievable if a rate R is
achievable such that Rδk = Rsk + Rok and
Rsk
Rs
k
+Ro
k
≥ δ,
∀k ∈ K. Since the whole message for a user, Wk is uniformly
distributed in Wk, this is equivalent to stating that at least
a portion 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 of the message is secret for each user.
When δ = 1, then all users want to maintain perfect secrecy,
i.e., there is no open message. When δ = 0, then the system
is a standard MAC with no secret messages.
Before we state our results, we also define the following:
g(ξ) ,
1
2
log2 (1 + ξ) , [ξ]
+
, max {ξ, 0} (25)
CMS(P) , g
(∑
k∈SPk
)
, CWS(P) , g
(∑
k∈ShkPk
) (26)
C˜WS(P) , g
( ∑
k∈ShkPk
1 +
∑
k∈SchkPk
)
, PS ,
∑
k∈S
Pk (27)
P , {P = (P1, . . . , PK) : 0 ≤ Pk ≤ P¯k, ∀k ∈ K} (28)
where it should be noted that CM,CW and C˜W are functions of
the transmit powers, even when it is not made explicit in the
text to simplify notation.
IV. ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE REGIONS
In this section, we find a set of achievable rates using
Gaussian codebooks and simultaneous superposition coding
as described in Appendix I-A, which we call G I for individual
constraints, and GC for collective constraints. We also find a
region achievable using TDMA, and is valid for both sets of
constraints. This region, which we call GT, is a subset of the
achievable region when using collective constraints, but en-
larges the achievable region when using individual constraints.
We should also note that these rates can be strengthened using
extractor functions as shown in [6], for details see [28].
A. Individual Secrecy
In [4], it has been shown that Gaussian codebooks can be
used to maintain secrecy for a single user wire-tap channel.
Using a similar approach, we show that an achievable region
using individual constraints is given by:
Theorem 1. Define G I(P) ={
R :
{∑
k∈S R
s
k ≤
[
CMS −
∑
k∈S C
W
k
]+
, ∀S∑
k∈S (R
s
k +R
o
k) ≤ CMS , ∀S
}
(29)
Then, the region
G I = convex closure of
⋃
P∈P
G I(P) (30)
is achievable with individual constraints.
Corollary 1.1. Define G Iδ(P) ={
R
δ :
{∑
k∈S R
δ
k ≤ 1δ
[
CMS −
∑
k∈S C
W
k
]+
, ∀S∑
k∈S R
δ
k ≤ CMS , ∀S
}
(31)
Then, the region
G Iδ = convex closure of
⋃
P∈P
G Iδ(P) (32)
is δ-achievable with individual constraints.
Proof: See Appendix I-B.
B. Collective Secrecy
In this section, we give an achievable rate region for
collective constraints. Our main result is:
Theorem 2. Define GC(P) ={
R :
{∑K
k=1 R
s
k ≤ [CMK − CWK]+∑
k∈S (R
s
k +R
o
k) ≤ CMS , ∀S
}
(33)
Then, the region
GC = convex closure of
⋃
P∈P
GC(P) (34)
is achievable with collective constraints.
Corollary 2.1. Define GCδ(P) ={
R
δ :
{∑K
k=1 R
δ
k ≤ 1δ [CMK − CWK]+, ∀k∑
k∈S R
δ
k ≤ CMS , ∀S
}
(35)
Then, the region
GCδ = convex closure of
⋃
P∈P
GCδ(P) (36)
is δ-achievable with collective constraints.
Proof: See Appendix I-C.
C. Time-Division Multiple-Access
We can also use TDMA to get an achievable region.
Consider this scheme: Let αk ∈ [0, 1], k = 1, . . . ,K and∑K
k=1 αk = 1. User k only transmits αk of the time with
power Pk/αk, hence satisfying the average power constraints.
The transmission uses the scheme described in [4]. Since only
one user is transmitting at a given time, both sets of constraints
collapse down to a set of single-user secrecy constraints, for
which the results were given in [4]:
Theorem 3. Define,
GT(P,α) ,

R :

R
s
k ≤ αk
[
g
(
(1−hk)Pk
αk+hkPk
)]+
, ∀k
Rsk +R
o
k ≤ αkg
(
Pk
αk
)
, ∀k

 (37)
Then, the following set of rates is achievable:
GT = convex closure of
⋃
P∈P
⋃
0α1PK
k=1 αk=1
GT(P,α) (38)
Corollary 3.1. Define
GTδ(P,α) ,

Rδ :

R
δ
k ≤ αkδ
[
g
(
(1−hk)Pk
αk+hkPk
)]+
, ∀k
Rδk ≤ αkg
(
Pk
αk
)
, ∀k

 (39)
Then, the region
GTδ = convex closure of
⋃
P∈P
⋃
0α1P
K
k=1 αk=1
GTδ(P,α) (40)
is δ-achievable.
Proof: See Appendix I-D.
For collective secrecy constraints, GT is a subset of GC.
For individual secrecy constraints, however, this region is
sometimes a superset of G I, and sometimes a subset of G I,
but most of the time it helps enlarge this region. We can then,
using time-sharing arguments, find a new achievable region for
individual constraints that is the convex-closure of the union
of the two regions, i.e.,
Proposition 4. The following region is achievable for indi-
vidual secrecy constraints:
G I∪ = convex closure of (G I ∪ GT) (41)
V. OUTER BOUNDS FOR DEGRADED EAVESDROPPER
In this section, we present outer bounds on the sets of
achievable secrecy rates for the degraded case. We find the se-
crecy sum-capacity which is equal for both sets of constraints,
and show the region given in Theorem 2 achieves this capacity,
as does the TDMA region given in Theorem 3.
A. Individual Secrecy
Theorem 5. For the GMAC-WT, given the set of transmit
powers P, the achievable rates for individual constraints
belong to the region
G¯ I(P) =
{
R :
{
Rsk ≤ CMk − CWk , ∀k∑
k∈S (R
s
k +R
o
k) ≤ CMS , ∀S
}
(42)
Corollary 5.1. The δ-achievable rates must be in the region
below:
G¯ Iδ(P) =
{
R
δ :
{
Rδk ≤ 1δ (CMk − CWk ) , ∀k∑
k∈S R
δ
k ≤ CMS , ∀S
}
(43)
Proof: See Appendix II-A.
B. Collective Secrecy
Our main result is presented in the following theorem:
Theorem 6. For the GMAC-WT with collective secrecy con-
straints, given the transmit power P, the secure rate-tuples
must be in the region
G¯C(P) =
{
R :
{∑K
k=1 R
s
k ≤ CMK − CWK∑
k∈S (R
s
k +R
o
k) ≤ CMS , ∀S
}
(44)
Corollary 6.1. The δ-achievable rates must be in the region
G¯Cδ(P) =
{
R
δ :
{∑K
k=1 R
δ
k ≤ 1δ (CMK − CWK) , ∀k∑
k∈S R
δ
k ≤ CMS , ∀S
}
(45)
Proof: See Appendix II-B.
C. Secrecy Sum-Capacity
For the degraded case, we can find the secrecy sum-
capacities for both sets of constraints. Incidentally, the secrecy
sum-capacity is the same, and is stated below:
Theorem 7. For the degraded case, the secrecy sum capacity
is given by
K∑
k=1
Rsk ≤ CMK − CWK = g
(
(1− h)PK
1 + hPK
)
(46)
Proof: See Appendix III
The converses proven in this section for the degraded case
are strong converses in the sense of [6]. Strengthening the
achievable rates as shown in the same paper thus establishes
the strong secret key sum-capacity for the degraded case.
VI. MAXIMIZATION OF SUM RATE FOR COLLECTIVE
CONSTRAINTS & COOPERATIVE JAMMING
Clearly, the collective secrecy constraints are more interest-
ing in the sense that they utilize the multi-access nature of the
channel. When we impose individual constraints, each user
has to fend for itself, confusing the eavesdropper without de-
pending on the other users. However, this only allows “good”
users to be able to communicate. Collective constraints, on the
other hand, allow users to help each other, and achieve a larger
rate region. Thus, in this section we concentrate on collective
constraints.
The achievable region given in Theorem 2 depends on the
transmit powers. We are naturally interested in the power
allocation P∗ = (P ∗1 , . . . , P ∗K) that would maximize the total
secrecy sum-rate. For ease of illustration, we consider the
K = 2 user case, and assume h1 ≤ h2. In other words, user 1’s
channel is “better” than user 2’s channel since a lower channel
gain means less information leaks to the eavesdropper.
A. Sum-Rate Maximization
We would like to find the power allocation that will max-
imize the secrecy sum-rate achievable found in Theorem 2.
Stated formally, we are interested in
max
P∈P
CMK − CWK = max
P∈P
g (P1 + P2)− g (h1P1 + h2P2) (47)
≡ min
P∈P
ρ(P) (48)
where ρ(P) , 1+h1P1+h2P21+P1+P2 , and we used the monotonicity of
the log function. The solution to this problem is given below:
Theorem 8. The secrecy sum-rate maximizing powers are
(P ∗1 , P
∗
2 ) =


(P¯1, P¯2), if h1 < 1, h2 < 1+h1P¯11+P¯1
(P¯1, 0), if h1 < 1, h2 ≥ 1+h1P¯11+P¯1
(0, 0), otherwise
(49)
Proof: See Appendix IV-A.
This result is easily generalized to K > 2 users, see [28].
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Fig. 2. The two-user rate region vs δ. h = 0.5.
B. Cooperative Jamming
The solution to the optimization problem given in Theorem
8 shows that when h2 ≥ 1+h1P¯11+P¯1 , which implies g
(
h2P2
1+h1P¯1
)
≥
g
(
P2
1+P¯1
)
for all P2 > 0, then user 2 should not transmit as
it cannot achieve secrecy. However, such a user k has high
eavesdropper channel gain, hk, and if it started “jamming”
the channel, then it would harm the eavesdropper more than it
would the intended receiver. Since the secrecy capacity for
the remaining single user is the difference of the channel
capacities, it might be possible to increase user 1’s capacity,
or even, when h1 > 1 allow it to start transmitting. The
jamming is done simply by transmitting white Gaussian noise,
i.e., X2 ∼ N (0, P2I). As shown in [28], it is always better
for “bad” users to jam. The problem is finding the power
allocations that will maximize the secrecy capacity for user
1, formally stated as:
max
P∈P
g
(
P1
1 + P2
)
− g
(
h1P1
1 + h2P2
)
≡ min
P∈P
ρ(P)
φ2(P2)
(50)
where φj(P ) , 1+hjP1+P . Note that we must have φ2(P2) > 1 to
have an advantage over not jamming. In general, this scheme
can be shown to achieve the following secrecy capacity:
Theorem 9. The secrecy capacity using cooperative jamming
is g
(
(1−h1)P∗1 +(1−h2)P∗2
1+h1P∗1 +h2P
∗
2
)
where the optimum power alloca-
tions are given by (P ∗1 , P ∗2 ) =

(P¯1, 0), if h1 ≤ 1, 1+h1P¯11+P¯1 ≤ h2 ≤ 1
(P¯1,
[
min
{
p, P¯2
}]+
), if h1 ≤ 1, h2 > 1
(P¯1,min
{
p, P¯2
}
), if h1 ≥ 1, h1−1h2−h1 < P¯2
(0, 0), if h1 ≥ 1, h1−1h2−h1 ≥ P¯2
(51)
where p = h1−1
h2−h1 +
q
h1h2(h2−1)[(h2−1)+(h2−h1)P¯1]
h2(h2−h1) .
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Fig. 3. The two-user rate region vs h. δ = 0.5.
Proof: See Appendix IV-B.
In the case unaccounted for above, when h1 ≤ 1 and h2 ≤
1+h1P¯
1+P¯
, both users should be transmitting as shown in Theorem
8. The solution shows that the jamming user should jam if it
is not single-user decodable, and if it has enough power to
make the other user “good” in the new standardized channel.
For the case with K > 2 users, see [28].
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results to illustrate the
achievable rates and our cooperative jamming scheme. To see
how the channel parameters and the required level of secrecy
affect the achievable rates, we consider the two-user degraded
case as illustrated in Figures 2,3. We observe that if the wire-
tapper’s degradedness is severe (h → 0), then the secrecy
sum-capacity goes to g(PK), i.e., we incur no loss in sum
capacity and can still communicate with perfect secrecy as
the sum capacity is achievable for both sets of constraints.
On the other hand, if the wire-tapper is not severely degraded,
(h→ 1), then the secrecy sum-capacity becomes zero. Another
point to note is that the δ-achievable sum-secrecy capacity
is limited by 12δ log
(
1+PK
1+hPK
)
, and this term is an increasing
function of PK. However, as PK → ∞, it is upper bounded
by − 12δ log h. We see that regardless of the available power,
the sum capacity with a non-zero level of secrecy is limited
by the degradedness, h, and the level of secrecy required, δ.
We also show the results of a scenario with a mobile
eavesdropper (in general non-degraded) and a static base
station in a 100× 100 grid. We use a simple path loss model,
and show the optimum transmit/jamming powers when the
eavesdropper is at (x, y) in Figure 4(a), and the resulting sum-
rates achieved with and without cooperative jamming in Figure
4(b), where lighter shades correspond to higher values. Users
need higher jamming powers when the eavesdropper is closer
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Fig. 4. Cooperative jamming example.
to the base station, but higher rates are achieved with less
power when the eavesdropper is closer to the jammer. Also,
the area near the BS where secrecy sum-rate is zero without
cooperative jamming is reduced.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered the GMAC in the presence
of an external eavesdropper from which information is to be
kept secret. We have established achievable rates, and outer
bounds on secrecy capacity for certain scenarios. We have
shown that the multiple-access nature of the channel can
be utilized to improve the secrecy of the system. Allowing
confidence in the secrecy of all users, the secrecy rate of a
user is improved since the undecoded messages of any set of
users acts as additional noise at the wire-tapper and precludes
it from decoding the remaining set of users. We have also
found the sum-rate maximizing power allocations, and show a
novel scheme, which we call cooperative jamming, which can
be utilized to increase the achievable sum-rate. We note the
cooperative achievements that are possible for the GGMAC-
WT with collective secrecy: (i) “good” users may sacrifice
their rates so that some “bad” users can achieve positive
secrecy rates, and (ii) really “bad” users may sacrifice power
to help the actual transmitters by jamming the eavesdropper.
APPENDIX I
ACHIEVABLE RATES
A. Superposition Encoding Scheme
For each user k ∈ K, consider the scheme:
1) Generate 3 codebooks Xsk,Xok and Xxk . Xsk consists of
M sk codewords, each component of which is drawn ∼
N (0, λskPk − ε). Codebook Xok has Mok codewords with
each component randomly drawn ∼ N (0, λokPk − ε) and
X
x
k has Mxk codewords with each component randomly
drawn ∼ N (0, λxkPk − ε) where ε is an arbitrarily small
number to ensure that the power constraints on the code-
words are satisfied with high probability and λsk + λok +
λxk = 1. Define Rxk = 1n logM
x
k , M
t
k = M
s
kM
o
kM
x
k and
Rtk =
1
n
logM tk = R
s
k +R
o
k +R
x
k .
2) To transmit message Wk = (W sk ,W ok ) ∈ Wsk ×Wok , user
k finds the 2 codewords corresponding to components of
Wk and also uniformly chooses a codeword from Xxk. He
then adds all these codewords and transmits the resulting
codeword, Xk, so that we are actually transmitting one of
M tk codewords. Since codewords are chosen uniformly, for
each message W sk , we transmit one of MokMxk codewords.
B. Individual Constraints
Let P ∈ P and R satisfy (29). We choose {Rxk} to satisfy:
Rok +R
x
k = C
W
k , ∀k ∈ K (52)∑
k∈S (R
s
k +R
o
k +R
x
k) ≤ CMS , ∀S ⊆ K (53)
if Rsk > 0, and if Rsk = 0, then we set Rxk = 0 and we do not
impose the condition given in (52). If R satisfies (29), we can
always choose {Rx} to satisfy the above.
Consider the subcode {Xsk}Kk=1. From this point of view,
the coding scheme described is equivalent to each user k ∈
K selecting one of M sk messages, and sending a uniformly
chosen codeword from among MokMxk codewords for each.
We can thus write the following:
H(W sk |Xkc ,Z)
= H(W sk ,Xk,Xkc ,Z)−H(Xk|W sk ,Xkc ,Z)
−H(Xkc ,Z) (54)
= H(Z|W sk ,Xk,Xkc) +H(Xk,Xkc |W sk ) +H(W sk )
−H(Xk|W sk ,Xkc ,Z)−H(Xkc ,Z) (55)
= H(Z|Xk,Xkc) +H(Xk,Xkc |W sk ) +H(W sk )
−H(Xk|W sk ,Xkc ,Z)−H(Z|Xkc)−H(Xkc) (56)
= H(W sk ) +H(Z|Xk,Xkc) +H(Xkc |W sk )−H(Xkc)(57)
+H(Xk|Xkc ,W sk )−H(Xk|W sk ,Xkc ,Z)−H(Z|Xkc )
= H(W sk )− I(Xk;Z|Xkc) + I(Xk;Z|W sk ,Xkc) (58)
where we used the fact that H(Xkc |W sk ) = H(Xkc). By
the GMAC coding theorem, we have I(Xk;Z|Xkc) ≤ nCWk .
We can also write I(Xk;Z|W sk ,Xkc) = H(Xk|W sk ,Xkc) −
H(Xk|W sk ,Xkc ,Z). The coding scheme implies that
H(Xk|W sk ,Xkc) = H(Xk|W sk ) = nCWk . Also,
H(Xk|W sk ,Xkc ,Z) ≤ nδn, where δn → 0 due to Fano’s
inequality; given W sk , the subcode for user k is, with high
probability, a “good” code for the wiretapper. Combining
these in (58), we can write
∆Ik ≥ 1−
nCWk − nCWk + nδn
H(W sk )
= 1− ǫ (59)
where ǫ = δn
Rs
k
→ 0 as n→∞.
The corollary follows simply by using the definition of δ-
achievability, and noting that if Rsk is achievable, then Rsk ≥
δRδk and substituting this into (29).
C. Collective Constraints
The proof is similar to the proof for individual constraints.
Let P ∈ P and R satisfy (33) and assume the coding scheme
is as given in Appendix I-A. We choose the rates such that∑K
k=1R
s
k = [C
M
K − CWK]+ (60)∑K
k=1 (R
o
k +R
x
k) = C
W
K (61)∑
k∈S (R
s
k +R
o
k +R
x
k) ≤ CMS , ∀S ⊆ K (62)
so that we show the achievability of the boundary, which can
be done by relabeling some of the open or extra messages
as secret. Clearly, lower secrecy rates are also thus achieved.
From (62) and the GMAC coding theorem, with high probabil-
ity the receiver can decode the codewords with low probability
of error. Define XΣ =
∑K
k=1 hkXk, and write
H(WsK|Z) = H(WsK,Z)−H(Z) (63)
= H(WsK,XΣ,Z)−H(XΣ|WsK,Z)−H(Z) (64)
= H(WsK) +H(Z|WsK,XΣ)−H(Z)
+H(XΣ|WsK)−H(XΣ|WsK,Z) (65)
= H(WsK)− I(XΣ;Z)− I(XΣ;Z|W(s)K ) (66)
where we used WsK → XΣ → Z ⇒ H(Z|WsK,XΣ) =
H(Z|XΣ) to get (66). We will consider the two mutual
information terms individually. First, we have the trivial bound
due to channel capacity: I(XΣ;Z) ≤ nCWK. We write the sec-
ond out as I(XΣ;Z|WsK) = H(XΣ|WsK)−H(XΣ|WsK,Z).
Since user k sends one of MokMxk codewords for each mes-
sage, H(XΣ|WsK) = n
∑K
k=1 (R
o
k +R
x
k) = nC
W
K from (61).
We can also write H(XΣ|WsK,Z) ≤ nδn where δn → 0 as
n → ∞ since, the eavesdropper can decode XΣ given WsK
due to (61) and code construction. Using these in (66), we get
∆CK ≥ 1−
nCWK − nCWK + nδn
n
∑K
k=1R
s
k
= 1− ǫ (67)
where ǫ = δnPK
k=1 R
s
k
→ 0 as n→∞.
The corollary simply follows from the definition of δ-
achievability as in the proof of Corollary 1.1.
D. TDMA
In the TDMA scheme described in Theorem 3, only one
user transmits at a time. Hence, H(W sk |Xkc ,Z) = H(W sk |Z)
as at any given time the codewords of the remaining users
do not provide any information to the eavesdropper about the
transmitting user’s message. As a result, both sets of secrecy
constraints become equivalent. Since this is a collection of
single-user schemes, using the achievability proof in [4], and
noting that the degradedness condition is only used for proving
the converse, we can, for each user, achieve
Rsk ≤
[
αkg
(
Pk
αk
)
− αkg
(
hkPk
αk
)]+
(68)
Rsk +R
o
k ≤ αkg
(
Pk
αk
)
(69)
which, when simplified, gives (37). We can use time-sharing
between different scheduling schemes to achieve the convex
closure of the union over all α and power allocations. The
corollary follows from Definition 2.
APPENDIX II
OUTER BOUNDS
We first adapt [4, Lemma 10] to upper bound the difference
between the received signal entropies at the receiver and
eavesdropper, when the eavesdropper’s signal is degraded:
Lemma 10 (Lemma 10 in [4]). Let ξ = 1
n
H(Y) where
Y,Z are as given in (6). Then,
H(Y) −H(Z) ≤ nξ − nφ(ξ) (70)
where φ(ξ) , 12 log
[
2πe
(
1− h+ h22ξ2pie
)]
.
Corollary 10.1.
H(Y|XS)−H(Z|XS) ≤ n (CMSc − CWSc) (71)
Proof: The proof is easily shown using the entropy power
inequality, [29]: Recall that H(Z) = H(
√
hY+NMW). Then,
by the entropy power inequality
2
2
n
H(Z) = 2
2
n
H(
√
hY+NMW) ≥ 2 2n [H(Y)+n log
√
h] + 2
2
n
H(NMW)
(72)
Now H(Y) = nξ and H(NMW) = n2 log[2πe(1− h)]. Hence,
2
2
n
H(Z) ≥ h22ξ + 2πe(1− h) (73)
which, after taking the log, gives
H(Z) ≥ n
2
log
[
2πe
(
1− h+ h2
2ξ
2πe
)]
(74)
subtracting from H(Y) = nξ completes the proof of the
lemma. To see the corollary, write
H(Y|XS) ≤ n
2
log (2πe(1 + PSc)) (75)
Let H(Y|XS) = nξ. Then, ξ ≤ 12 log (2πe(1 + PSc)), and
since φ(ξ) is a non-increasing function of ξ, we get φ(ξ) ≥
φ
(
1
2 log (2πe(1 + PSc))
)
. Since {Xk} are independent, we
can use the lemma with Y → Y|XS and Z→ Z|XS ,
H(Y|XS)−H(Z|XS) (76)
≤ n
2
log (2πe(1 + PSc))− n
2
log [2πe (1 + hPSc)] (77)
= n (CMSc − CWSc) (78)
We also present the following lemma that is valid for the
general (non-degraded) case:
Lemma 11. Let S ⊆ K. Then,
I(W sS ;Y|XSc ,Z) ≤ H(Y|XSc)−H(Z|XSc) + nǫn (79)
Proof: I(W sS ;Y|XSc ,Z)
= H(Y|XSc ,Z)−H(Y|W sS ,XSc ,Z)
≤ H(Y|XSc ,Z)−H(Y|W sS ,XK,Z) (80)
= H(Y|XSc ,Z)−H(Y|XK,Z) (81)
= I(XS ;Y|XSc ,Z) (82)
= I(XS ;Y|XSc) + I(XS ;Z|XSc ,Y)
− I(XS ;Z|XSc) (83)
≤ I(XS ;Y|XSc) +H(XS |XSc ,Y)
− I(XS ;Z|XSc) (84)
≤ I(XS ;Y|XSc)− I(XS ;Z|XSc) + nǫn (85)
= H(Y|XSc)−H(Y|XK)−H(Z|XSc)
+H(Z|XK) + nǫn (86)
= H(Y|XSc)−H(Z|XSc) + nǫn (87)
where ǫn → 0 as n → ∞ and ǫ → 0. In (85) we used
H(XS |XSc ,Y) ≤ H(W sS |XSc ,Y) ≤ nǫn where ǫn → 0
as n → ∞ from Fano’s inequality. The last step comes from
H(Y|XK) = H(NM) = H(Z|XK) = H(NW).
A. Individual Constraints
The proof is a simple extension of the proof of Lemma 7
in [4], but stronger in the sense of [6] as we prove an outer
bound satisfying H(W sk |Xkc ,Z) ≥ H(W sk ) − ǫ, for all k ∈
K. Clearly, any set of rates satisfying the original individual
constraints also satisfies these constraints. We begin with:
Lemma 12. The individual secrecy rates must satisfy:
Rsk ≤
1
n
(H(Y|Xkc )−H(Z|Xkc)) + ǫn (88)
Proof: Note that H(WS |XSc ,Y,Z) ≤ H(WS |Y) ≤
nǫ′n for all S ⊆ K from Fano’s inequality. Using
H(W sk |Xkc ,Z) ≥ H(W sk )− ǫ = nRsk − ǫ, we can write
nRsk ≤ H(W sk |Xkc ,Z) + ǫ (89)
≤ H(W sk |Xkc ,Z) + nǫ′′n −H(W sk |Xkc ,Y,Z) (90)
= I(W sk ;Y|Xkc ,Z) + nǫ′′n (91)
and we can then use Lemma 11 with S = {k}.
When Z is a degraded version of Y, Corollary 10.1 gives
Rsk ≤ CMk − CWk = g
(
(1 − h)Pk
1 + hPk
)
(92)
Corollary 5.1 follows by noting that a rate Rδ is achievable
iff all Rδk are such that (δRδk, Rδk) is achievable for user k.
B. Collective Constraints
We show that any achievable rate vector,R, needs to satisfy
Theorem 6. We start with a lemma similar to Lemma 12:
Lemma 13.∑K
k=1R
s
k ≤
1
n
(H(Y)−H(Z)) + ǫn (93)
where ǫn → 0 as ǫ→ 0.
Proof: We have H(WsK|Y,Z) ≤ H(WsK|Y) ≤ nǫ′n
from Fano’s inequality. Using H(WsK|Z) ≥ H(WsK) − ǫ =
n
∑K
k=1 R
s
k − ǫ, we can write
n
∑K
k=1R
s
k ≤ H(WsK|Z) + ǫ (94)
≤ H(WsK|Z) + nǫn −H(WsK|Y,Z) (95)
= I(WsK;Y|Z) + nǫn (96)
and we can then use Lemma 11 with S = K.
When Z is a degraded version of Y, Corollary 10.1 gives
∑K
k=1R
s
k ≤ CMK − CWK = g
(
(1− h)PK
1 + hPK
)
(97)
APPENDIX III
SUM CAPACITY FOR DEGRADED CASE
For the individual constraints, we can find the following
limit on sum capacity by noting that ∆Ik ≥ 1 for all k ∈ K
implies ∆IK ≥ 1 as shown in Section III-A.1. Hence, when
the individual constraints are satisfied, the collective constraint
must also be satisfied. Thus, we can write
K∑
k=1
Rsk ≤ H(W sK|Z) + ǫ ≤ I(W sK;Y|Z) + ǫ (98)
as in the proof of Lemma 13 and use Lemma 11 to get∑K
k=1 R
s
k ≤ CMK − CWK.
For the collective constraint, the outer bound was given in
Theorem 6 as CMK−CWK. The scheme to get the achievable rates
given in 2 achieves this rate, and hence is the sum-capacity
for collective constraints.
From Theorem 3, we see that TDMA achieves a secrecy
sum-rate of
∑K
k=1 αkg
(
(1−h)Pk
αk+hPk
)
. Maximizing this over the
time-sharing parameters {αk}, is a convex optimization prob-
lem over αk whose solution is
α∗k =
Pk∑K
k=1 Pk
(99)
giving a sum rate of CMK−CWK. Since the individual constraints
are satisfied, this is an achievable sum-rate for the individual
constraints, as well. Hence, the sum-capacity for both sets of
constraints is CMK − CWK.
APPENDIX IV
SUM-RATE MAXIMIZATION
A. Optimum Powers
We start with writing the Lagrangian to be minimized,
L(P,µ) = ρ(P)−
2∑
k=1
µ1kPk +
2∑
k=1
µ2k(Pk − P¯k) (100)
Equating the derivative of the Lagrangian to zero, we get
∂L(P∗,µ)
∂P ∗j
= ρ˙j(P
∗)− µ1j + µ2j = 0 (101)
where ρ˙j(P) , hj−ρ(P)1+P1+P2 . It is easy to see that if hj > ρ(P
∗),
then µ1j > 0, and we have P ∗j = P¯j . If hj < ρ(P∗), then
we similarly find that P ∗j = 0. Finally, if hj = ρ(P∗), we can
have 0 < P ∗j < P¯j . However, then ρ˙j(P∗) = 0, so we can
set P ∗j = 0 with no effect on the secrecy sum-rate. Thus, we
have P ∗j = P¯j if hj < ρ(P∗), and P ∗j = 0 if hj ≥ ρ(P∗).
B. Cooperative Jamming
The Lagrangian and its gradient are:
L(P,µ) = ρ(P)
φ2(P2)
−
2∑
k=1
µ1kPk +
2∑
k=1
µ2k(Pk − P¯k) (102)
∂L
∂P ∗1
=
ρ˙1(P
∗)
φ2(P ∗2 )
− µ11 + µ21 = 0 (103)
∂L
∂P ∗2
=
ρ˙2(P
∗)φ2(P ∗2 )− ρ(P∗)φ˙2(P ∗2 )
φ22(P
∗)
− µ12 + µ22 = 0
(104)
where φ˙2(P ) , h2−φ2(P )1+P . Consider user 1. The same argu-
ment as in the sum-rate maximization proof leads to P ∗1 = P¯
if h1 < ρ(P∗) and P ∗1 = 0 if h1 ≥ ρ(P∗). Now we need to
find P ∗2 . We can write (104) as
∂L
∂P ∗2
=
ψ2(P
∗)
(1 + P ∗1 + P
∗
2 )
2(1 + h2P ∗2 )2
−µ12+µ22 = 0 (105)
where ψ2(P) = P1h2(h2 − h1)(P2 − p)(P2 − p¯) and
p =
−h2(1− h1) +
√
D
h2(h2 − h1) , p¯ =
−h2(1− h1)−
√
D
h2(h2 − h1) (106)
D = h1h2(h2 − 1)[(h2 − 1) + (h2 − h1)P1)] (107)
Note that the optimum power allocation for user 1 is
equivalent to P ∗1 = P¯ if h1 < φ2(P ∗2 ) and P ∗1 = 0
if h1 ≥ φ2(P ∗2 ). Also observe that ψ2(P) is an (upright)
parabola in P2. If h1 < 1, we automatically have P ∗1 = P¯ . In
addition, we have p¯ < 0. We first find when P ∗2 = 0. We see
that ψ2(P) ≥ 0 for all P ∈ P if p < 0, equivalent to having
two negative roots, or D < 0 ⇒ h2 ≤ φ1(P¯ ), equivalent to
having no real roots of ψ2. Consider 0 < P ∗2 < P¯ . This is
possible iff ψ2(P∗) = 0. Since P ∗1 > 0, this happens only
when h1 = h2 or P ∗2 = p > 0. However, if h1 = h2, we
should be transmitting not jamming. The last case to examine
is when P ∗2 = P¯ . This implies that ψ2(P¯) < 0, and is satisfied
when p > P¯2.
Assume h2 ≥ h1 ≥ 1. In this case, we are guaranteed
p ≥ 0. If P ∗1 = 0, then we must have P ∗2 = 0 since the
secrecy rate is 0. If h1 = h2, then regardless of P ∗2 , we have
ψ2(P¯ , P
∗
2 ) = 0 and jamming does not affect secrecy capacity,
and we have P ∗2 = 0⇒ P ∗1 = 0. Assume h2 > h1. We would
like to find when we can have P ∗1 > 0. Since h1 < φ2(P ∗2 ),
we must have P ∗2 > h1−1h2−h1 ≥ 0, and ψ2(P¯ , P ∗2 ) ≤ 0. This
implies p¯ ≤ P ∗2 ≤ p. It is easy to see that P ∗2 = min
{
p, P¯
}
if h1−1
h2−h1 < min
{
p, P¯2
}
and P ∗2 = 0 otherwise.
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